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HOCHGERTEL v. CANADA DRY CORPORATION:
THE HAZARDS OF TENDING BAR
The plaintiff, a bartender in the performance of his calling, incurred per-
sonal injuries when an innocuous-looking bottle of soda water exploded behind
the bar. The defendant, who manufactured the malcontent bottle, sold and
delivered it directly to the plaintiff's employer. Plaintiff brought two actions;'
in this one2 he sought recovery on breach of warranty theories. The lower
court sustained preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer 3 and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. This Recent Case will evaluate
Hochgertel in the light of decisions of this and other jurisdictions. Pennsyl-
vania's position on the various issues raised will be compared with other views;
the comparison will form the basis for conclusions about the decision.
The Hochgertel decision leaves the law on the privity of contract re-
quirement for recovery on contract theories in a state of some confusion in
Pennsylvania. Federal courts currently make such guarded statements as
this: "it is now clear that privity of contract is not required in Pennsylvania,
certainly not in suits by purchasers of new automobiles against the manufac-
turer."'4 One wonders if the only safe approach now is to consider each of our
decisions on the privity issue restricted to its own facts.
To understand the implications of Hochgertel it is necessary to study a
long line of cases representing a trend toward abolishment of the privity
requirement in this state. In the beginning the rule was stated in this manner:
"Privity of contract is the relation that exists between two or more contracting
parties. It is essential to the maintenance of an action on any contract that
there should subsist a privity between the plaintiff and defendant, in respect
to the matter sued on."6 The leading case of Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax
Mfg. Co. espoused this inflexible rule in dictum as late as 1932.0 But by then
decisional inroads had penetrated the doctrine, and an exception had devel-
oped in the case of food products. 7 A little over a decade after Timberland a
1. Plaintiff brought separate actions of assumpsit and trespass, authorized by the
supreme court in Cunningham v. Joseph Home Co., 406 Pa. 1, 176 A.2d 648 (1961).
2. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
3. Id. at 612, 187 A.2d at 577.
4. Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888, 891 (D.Pa. 1962).
5. Hartley v. Phillips, 198 Pa. 9, 13 (1901).
6. 61 F.2d 391, 393 (3d Cir. 1932) (dictum). Although in 1 WILLISTON, SALES §
244 n.8a (rev. ed. 1948) the case is cited as upholding the privity requirement, it should
be kept in mind both that this was dictum and that the plaintiff conceded the point. See
Del Duca, Commercial Code Litigation: Conflicts of Law; Sales, 65 DIcx. L. REv. 283,
306 n.6 (1961); Note, Liability of Manufacturers and Wholesalers to Ultimate Con-
sumers in Pennsylvania for Breach of Warranty, 31 TEMP. L.Q. 62, 64 (1957).
7. Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Atl. 537 (1931)
Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 Atl. 931 (1915).
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federal court voiced the precocious opinion that privity had been abolished
from Pennsylvania law. "The abolition of 'the requirement occurred first in
the food cases, next in the beverages decisions and now has been extended to
those cases in which the article manufactured, not dangerous or even benefi-
cial if properly made, injured a person because it was manufactured improp-
erly."'8 But Pennsylvania courts insisted on deciding for themselves what
Pennsylvania law was, and decisions indicating the contrary continued to be
handed down. For example, in Loch v. Confair9 recovery on breach of war-
ranty theories was refused because the plaintiff was not party to a contract.
The facts of the case have much in common with those of Hochgertel: plaintiff
was injured by an exploding bottle before she bought it in a grocery store.
The court was not greatly impressed by plaintiff's argument that a contract
was not a necessary ingredient of an action in assumpsit, and declined war-
ranty protection. 10 If the plaintiff had been a subpurchaser the warranties may
have been extended to her." But Kaczmarkiewicz v. J. A. Williams Co.
12
said they would not be extended to those not conventionally in privity except
for warranties which ran with food products. The employee of one who pur-
chased a stepladder sought to recover from a remote vendor, on his employer's
contract. Even if the plaintiff acquired the rights of the employer, lack of
privity barred the claim, concluded the court. 1" Facciolo Paving and Construc-
tion Co. v. Road Machinery Inc.14 reached the same conclusion with respect
to the remote purchaser of defective 'road-grading machinery. However, it
was thought' 5 that broad statements made by the Pennsylvania Superior Court
in Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co.16 might have the effect of overruling prior cases
requiring privity in this state. In Jarnot, the subpurchaser of a faulty and
dangerous truck was allowed to recover from the manufacturer. Shortly there-
after the famous Pritchard case17 added its weight to those not requiring priv-
ity, permitting the subpurchaser of cigarettes to go against the manufacturer
on breach-of-warranty theories. Thompson v. Reedman,'8 purporting to apply
8. Mannz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445, 450 (3d Cir. 1946) (dictum). Since
no breach of warranty was found the statements as to privity would appear to be dictum.
See Childs v. Austin Supply Co., 408 Pa. 403, 184 A.2d 250 (1962).
9. 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949).
10. Id. at 163, 63 A.2d at 26.
11. Ibid.
12. 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 14 (1957).
13. Id. at 16-17.
14. 8 Chest. Co. Rep. 375 (Pa. 1958).
15. Del Duca, op. cit. supra note 6, at 307 n.98.
16. 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959). The case was followed in Willman
v. American Motor Sales Co., 44 Erie Co.L.J. 51 (1961).
17. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
18. 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
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Pennsylvania law, extended the zone of protection considerably beyond that of
any of the prior cases. A guest passenger in an automobile recovered from the
remote manufacturer thereof on breach of warranty theories. The one ground
on which this case might be distinguished from Hochgertel is that here, clearly,
a dangerous instrumentality was involved-a bottle of soda water, on the
other hand, has an innocent appearance. Reedman was followed in Allen v.
Savage Arms Corp.19 The plaintiff was injured when a shotgun purchased
by his father blew up. In Allen the Uniform Commercial Code 20 overcame any
problem as to privity of the boy with his father on his father's contract of
sale.
At this stage of the developing trend away, down came the Hochgertel
decision, breathing new life into the dying requirement of privity. Vindicated
are the earlier lower court decisions holding that one may not recover on a
contract to which he is not a party. Cases apparently contrary to Hochgertel
are either erroneous or are exceptions to a general requirement of privity.
The supreme court expressly condones cases "involving food, beverages, and
like goods for human consumption,"'2 1 which permit a subpurchaser to sue
directly. It is not possible to ascertain from the language of the opinion
whether the court considers a mishap owing to a bad bottle as falling under
the food-products exception to the general privity requirement. If one reads
the language of the opinion carefully, some doubt is cast on whether any im-
plied warranty would cover the bottle itself. Since the court finds that the
warranty did not extend to this plaintiff it becomes unnecessary to answer
the question "Did the warranty cover the container as well as the contents
of the bottle ?-22 The question reserved by the court has earned Dean Prosser's
amused indignation:
There remains . . . an astonishing little argument over whether the
"warranty" of food includes the safety of the container in which it is
sold . . . . This metaphysical distinction between the container and
the contents can only be regarded as amazing. The two are sold by
each seller, and received by each ultimate purchaser, as an integrated
whole; and where the action is against the immediate seller (by one
in privity), it is well-settled that the warranty covers both. One can
only surmise that the courts which make the distinction have been
disturbed by an uneasy uncertainty as to whether, despite the evi-
dence, the plaintiff may not have tried to open the bottle by banging
it on the radiator. Suppose that a bottle of Coca Cola explodes, and
cuts the plaintiff's wrist-is recovery really to turn on whether the
19. 52 Luz.Leg.Reg. 150 (1962).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318A (1954).
21. Supra note 2, at 614, 187 A.2d at 578.
22. Id. at 612, 187 A.2d at 577.
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explosion is due to a flaw in the glass or to an over-charged bev-
erage ?23
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.24 and other cases held that recovery does
depend on such a distinction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stands a
good chance of replying to Prosser's question. When the plaintiff in one
of these broken bottle cases is a subpurchaser, he will argue that his case
falls under the food-products exception to the privity requirement. His
opponent will contend that in effect the case does not because the warranty
does not spread its protection over the container.
The cases not involving food products which are inconsistent with Hoch-
gertel on the privity issue may involve other exceptions to the general re-
quirement. Some of them may be explained away because they are concerned
with liability for the manufacture of dangerous instrumentalities such as auto-
mobiles and shotguns. The law of privity in warranty actions may undergo the
same development seen in tort actions, the development that culminated in
Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co.
25
Another factor which might explain apparently contrary cases is the pres-
ence of an express warranty made to the ultimate consumer by the manufac-
turer.2 6 A very strong policy dictates that the manufacturer should be made
liable to all groups within the distributive chain which are the target of com-
mercial solicitation.2 7 Among the rules of law which the Jarnot court draws
upon in support of its decision is this: "a manufacturer who by means of
advertising extols his product, in the effort to persuade the public to buy,
may thereby incur liability to a purchaser notwithstanding privity between
the purchaser and the manufacturer is wholly lacking."'28
When this entire body of case law is considered, the conclusion is ines-
capable that the privity requirement is a tool of policy, that and nothing more.
In accordance with "social justice" 29 the obligation of the manufacturer is
extended "as far as the relevant social policy requires."30 A sure sign of
policy afoot is the number of fictions that play hide-and-go-seek with logic
23. Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1138 (1960). (Footnotes
omitted.)
24. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
25. 211 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 395 (1938).
26. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd per curiam on
rehearing, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932), aff'd on second appeal, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090
(1934) is the leading case on this point.
27. Note, Implied Warranty of Merchantability Renders Manufacturer Liable to
Buyer's Wife Despite Disclaimer Clause and Absence of Privity of Contract, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 631 (1961).
28. Supra note 16, at 429-30, 156 A.2d at 572.
29. Supra note 2, at 615, 187 A.2d at 589; see Fricke, Personal Injury Damages in
Products Liability, 6 VILL. L. REV. 123, 155 (1960-61).
30. James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 192, 193 (1955).
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in the products liability cases. 8' "[C]ourts ... invent a remarkable variety of
highly ingenious, and equally unconvincing, theories of fictitious agency,
third-party-beneficiary contract, and the like, to get around the lack of privity
between the plaintiff and the defendant."32 Another favorite fiction employed
by the courts is one which visualizes a covenant running with the goods,
3
just as a covenant may run with the land. "If, as has been often said, the
warranty runs with the goods, then it can protect no one who does not ac-
quire the title; and the employee34 . . . cannot recover. It may well be that we
are not yet ready, and may never be ready, to extend the strict liability to
such people; but if the time is to come when the courts are ready for it, they
have laid up trouble in heaven."' 35 Notwithstanding his observation Dean
Prosser apparently thought that such employees would be extended warranty
protection.36
The Hochgertel case concludes otherwise. The court stresses the fact that
this particular plaintiff was not a purchaser.
In no case in Pennsylvania has recovery against the manufacturer for
breach of warranty been extended beyond a purchaser in the distribu-
tive chain. In fact the inescapable conclusion ... is that no warranty
will be implied in favor of one who is not in the category of a pur-
chaser ....
[T]he basis for recovery upon an implied warranty, absent a specific
statutory exception . . . must be that the implied warranty forms a
part of the consideration for the contract, and flows from manufac-
turer to subpurchaser through the conduit of a contractual chain.
3 7
The statutory exception the court refers to is that contained in section 2-318
of the Uniform Commercial Code. 38 Evidently it was argued that an employee
would fall under the extension of warranty protection afforded by that sec-
tion. The provision reads as follows:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any nat-
ural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is
a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may
31. For an entertaining survey of the fictions that have developed, see Gilliam,
Judicial Legislation, Legal Fictions, and Products Liability: the Agency Theory, 37
ORE. L. REV. 217 (1958). "This article is, in essence, an essay on the usefulness of
subterfuge." Id. at 219.
32. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1124.
33. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
34. Here Dean Prosser cites the case of Jax Beer Co. v. Schaeffer, 173 S.W.2d 285
(Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1943).
35. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1133. (Footnotes omitted.)
36. Id. at 1142.
37. Supra note 2, at 615-16, 187 A.2d at 578-79.
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (1954).
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use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in per-
son by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section.A
9
Based on a reading of this section, the court concludes that "Clearly the
Code gives no basis for the extension of the existing warranty to an employee
of the purchaser. . . . An employee is in none of these categories. ' 40 The
court adopts a policy of strict construction, flatly refusing to "add to legis-
lation,"'4 1 despite the fact that it quotes comment 3 to section 2-318 which
says in part:
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions
the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the
section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the devel-
oping case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer
who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
42
One cannot help but feel that although the comment expressly provides that
section 2-318 is not intended to restrict the developing case law, the court
demonstrates reluctance to go beyond the enumerated classes to permit an
employee to recover on the employer's warranty.
Not all jurisdictions are in line with Hochgertel on this point. Leading
cases in other jurisdictions have adopted the view that an employee who is
not party to any contract of sale may recover on his employer's sales contract
for breach of warranty.43 In the Ohio case of Mahoney v. Shaker Square
Beverages,44 a servant was injured when a bottle of Black Horse ale exploded.
The court held that the bottle was a dangerous instrumentality, that the war-
39. "Since the Code does not deal with manufacturer's liability, its drafters ap-
parently concluded upon an analysis of the interests that manufacturer's liability is
socially less necessary than the extension of dealer's liability to the buyer's family."
Implied Warranties, op. cit. supra note 27, at 631. The former has been referred to as
the vertical and the latter as the horizontal line of extension of liability. Del Duca,
Extension of Warranty Protection Under Section 2-318, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CO-ORDINATOR ANNOTATED 419-21 (1963).
40. Supra note 2, at 612-13, 187 A.2d at 577. For the meanings of the terms
"family" and "household" the court in Hochgertel looks to the cases of Way Estate,
379 Pa. 421, 109 A.2d 164 (1954) and Shank Estate, 399 Pa. 656, 161 A.2d 47 (1960) ;
the former dealt with the construction of an alleged family agreement and the latter
with whether certain property was household property and therefore entitled to an
exemption.
This court had refused to pass on the question of whether an employee was included
within the class of persons to whom warranty protection was extended by § 2-318 in
Childs v. Austin Supply Co., 408 Pa. 403, 184 A.2d 250 (1962).
41. Id. at 614, 187 A.2d at 577. The court cites Altieri v. Allentown Retirement
Bd., 368 Pa. 176, 81 A.2d 884 (1951), in which a statutory construction act was cited
for the rule of strict construction of the statute there involved.
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318, comment 2 (1954).
43. See Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39 (1961).
44. 64 Ohio L. Abs. 200, 102 N.E.2d 281 (1951).
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ranty of merchantable quality was breached, and that an action could be
brought against the retailer. In the case of Petersen v. Lamb Rubber Co.,
45
an employee was injured when a grinding wheel bought by his employer dis-
integrated. He was allowed to recover on breach of warranty theories against
the manufacturer because the court found that his successive right to use the
wheel fulfilled the privity requirement. Perhaps both these cases require a
finding of dangerous instrumentality before the requirement is relaxed. 46 It
must be conceded that, notwithstanding the opinion of the court in the Ma-
honey case, some valid doubt as to whether a bottle is a dangerous instru-
mentality may well exist.
The -Connecticut Supreme Court construed an almost identical statute
the same way the Pennsylvania Supreme Court construed section 2-318. 47 A
college cook suffered personal injuries through the use of some soap pur-
chased by her employer. The court refused to find that the cook was a member
of the household of the purchaser, and relied heavily on the fact that the legis-
lature could have chosen much more suitable wording to extend warranty
protection to such persons had it wished to do so. One wonders if, because
of commonly accepted strict-construction principles, recovery will be more
limited in jurisdictions which have a limited statutory extension of protection.
That conventional kind of thinking may have been a factor moving the Hoch-
gertel court to deny warranty protection to an employee.
Why is it important that the plaintiff is denied warranty relief since
there is always the possibility of a suit in negligence? One authority has
enumerated the following reasons: (1) plaintiffs often are a considerable
distance from production lines and therefore encounter difficulties of proof
(the effects of this disadvantage can be alleviated by application of the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine) ; (2) often the conduits in the merchandising chain
are wholly free of negligence so there is no cause of action against them; (3)
a shorter statute of limitations may be provided for the tort action.48 Dean
Prosser, on the other hand, is of the view that limiting the plaintiff to his
remedy in tort occasions him little or no hardship.
[A]n honest estimate might very well be that there is not one case
in a hundred in which strict liability would result in recovery where
negligence does not....
.... [I]n every jurisdiction . .. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
or . . . its practical equivalent . . . gives rise to a permissible infer-
45. 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575 (1960). But see Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc.,
135 Cal. App. 2d 653, 288 P.2d 75 (1955).
46. Note, Implied Warranties: Modification of the Requirement of Privity of Con-
tract in California, 34 So. CAL. L. REV. 98, 99 (1960).
47. Duart v. Axton-Cross, 19 Conn. Supp. 188, 110 A.2d 647 (1954).
48. Del Duca, op. cit. supra note 39, at 416.
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ence of the defendant's negligence, which gets the plaintiff to the
jury. And in cases against manufacturers, once the cause of the harm
is laid at their doorstep, a jury verdict for the defendant on the negli-
gence issue is virtually unknown.
49
Despite the strong view above advanced one cannot help but be a little uneasy
about the adequacy of the negligence remedy. Although that one is always
available, plaintiffs continue to battle for the remedy resting on breach of
warranty.
The Hochgertel case, though, is of the view that the plaintiff's remedy
in trespass is perfectly adequate, and points out 50 that the regulations as to
proof set out in Loch v. Confair51 will govern the subsequent disposition of
the case. Concerning the subject that court said,
Plaintiffs having testified to the manner in which the accident oc-
curred, the burden should then rest upon the defendant A. & P. Com-
pany to show that after the bottle came into its possession it was not
subjected to any mishandling or to any unusual atmospheric or tem-
perature changes. The duty would then devolve upon the Beverage
Company to establish that it conducted its operations with due care
and according to the usual and proper methods generally employed
in the bottling industry.
52
This manner of applying the res ipsa loquitur doctrine has been criticized.
Primarily the criticism rests on the ground that there are too many causes
other than the defendant's negligence which could explain the mishap.
53 It
has been said by experts that it is virtually impossible for a bottle to explode
without impact. 54 If this were accepted as true it would reduce the likelihood
of the manufacturer being responsible for the defect.
Some authorities are of the view that the courts even through the ap-
plication of negligence principles are imposing something close to strict
liability in the exploding bottle situation.55 The courts have justified their
doing so.
It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products
having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products
49. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1114-15.
50. Supra note 2, at 616, 187 A.2d at 578.
51. 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953).
52. Id. at 217, 93 A.2d at 454. For a general consideration of the manner of ap-
plying res ipsa loquitur in these cases, see Fricke, op. cit. supra note 29, at 34.
53. Possible causes of exploding bottles include such occurrences as sudden changes
in temperature causing unequal expansion of different parts of the glass, overcharging
of gas, defectively manufactured bottles, inadequate system of inspection for defects,
excessive shaking on a hot day, and mishandling in transportation weakening the fabric
of the bottle. Id. at 29.
54. Id. at 30.
55. Id. at 28.
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nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the public interest
to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon
the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture
of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market.5 0
Reduce the hazard and spread the risk5 7 are the arguments in support of
strict liability. Arguments can be advanced in support of the court's decision
in Hochgertel. Why should this individual have contract protection if he did
not pay for it? Why, in any event, does he need it, in view of the generous
application the Pennsylvania court gives res ipsa loquitur? But the law of the
future will undoubtedly impose strict liability on manufacturers of consumers'
goods. Perhaps the swiftest route to this destination is via the application of
warranty principles.
MELVIN DILDINE
56. Supra note 24, at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (concurring opinion).
57. Dean Prosser feels that the risk-spreading argument is entitled to the most
respect. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 22, at 1120.
